

## THANKSGIVING POSTPONED

By E. OBENAU

*During the years 1940-1944 an attempt was made to develop a co-ordinated European economy. The invasions have interrupted this process for the time being. What were its preliminary results?*

**I**N the summers of 1942 and 1943, the brilliant yellow of spreading fields of sunflowers and rapeseed gave the countryside of the continent of Europe a new appearance. Once looked down upon, these plants, in the modesty of their demands upon the soil and the rich oil content of their seeds, have become a typical example of the change which was beginning to make itself felt on the Continent. Their compulsory planting to make up for Europe's shortage of vegetable and animal fats and oils was part of the planned economy which had already been tested in Germany and which the German occupation forces brought with them after the Blitz campaigns of 1939, 1940, and 1941. In France the oil-seed culture was increased from 20,000 acres before the war to one million acres in 1944; in Belgium, with German seed, from 1,000 acres to 63,000 acres. Of the 8,000 tons of fats distributed in November and December 1944 by the "liberators" in Belgium, 6,400 tons came from this rapeseed harvest.

Planned economics and strict rationing of raw materials had rendered Germany independent of imports during periods of crisis. When the Anglo-Saxons included even their former allies in their blockade, the expansion of these planned economics to the entire European continent represented the sole means of preventing starvation and economic collapse. Crops harvested on the battlefields of yesterday began to fill barns and storehouses. Manual and industrial production got under way again. The blockade was being countered by hard work and planning. The day seemed not far off when the peoples of Europe would amicably join up their tables in a common celebration of thanksgiving.

Then suddenly a storm broke loose with the invasion in the west and south and east. With the assembled force of three vast empires it swept up to the Rhine, the Po, and the Oder. What had been an occupied Europe became a "liberated" Europe. On the heels of the Allied invasion armies there followed the politicians of yesterday who began a hectic search for the threads which had been broken off by their flight. But wherever they went they met with something new, something they had not expected when they abandoned their

countries in headlong flight, when they established exile governments in Brown's Hotel in London and while they hung about in the antechambers of Washington and Moscow.

Ah, who were the men who had offered themselves for this devilish work of co-operating with Germany? Down with the collaborationists! Shots rang out faster and faster in the yards of the courthouses and on the streets. The mouths of those had to be stopped who had seen the truth and dared to stand up for it. The consternation of the returned politicians and their masters over what had happened during their absence waxed from day to day.

### INTER-EUROPEAN ECONOMY

Mars had ruled the hour, and military necessity had to be the supreme law. It had often been incomprehensible, irksome, heavy-handed. Yet the harvests on the fields of Europe, its industrial production in the years from 1939 to 1943, are a monument to economic common sense. Their sober statistics proclaim the beginnings of a common European production which justified new hopes for what had been considered an old and decrepit continent.

Germany's foreign trade in the years 1939 to 1943 was discussed in detail in the August/September 1944 issue of this magazine. In 1943 it amounted to almost 60 per cent more than in 1938, the last year of peace. Germany's exports had risen to over three times those of Great Britain, which had—according to the 1943 White Book on Britain's war production—shrunk to 29 per cent of the prewar level. Germany even exceeded USA exports (excluding Lend-Lease deliveries).

While England had to stop all iron and steel exports, and while her coal production could, in spite of all her rich mines, no longer cover her home consumption, Germany increased her deliveries of iron and steel and even of that most precious commodity of blockaded Europe, grain and seed, to an extent which amazed the Allies. Moreover, she was able to do so although her transports had to go by rail or along the limited inland waterways of Europe. Italy alone had since 1940 received year after year an annual quantity of twelve million tons of coal from Germany. In addition to this, in order to save coal, initial work had been started

to extend Europe's production of electric power by exploiting available water power and by an interstate exchange of electricity. Germany passed on her successful methods of production and the results of her specialized research, aided the improvement of communications, and exported high-quality seed and cattle for breeding purposes.

The greater part of Europe's trade, including that of the neutral countries, passed through the clearing system in Berlin, as did the remittances—2 billion marks in 1940/43—of the millions of foreign laborers in Germany to their home countries. By maintaining stable prices at home and insisting upon stable prices among her European trade partners too, Germany sought to safeguard Europe's commerce from dangerous upheavals. Questions of price, formerly the object of long disputes, were rapidly solved, as is proved by the signing of the German-Danish-Swedish-Finnish timber agreement of 1942, which established a secure market at fixed prices for northern Europe and anticipated the solution of postwar problems. The question of tariffs and most-favored-nations clauses, those formerly so tenaciously defended attributes of a permanent economic war among the nations, were almost entirely eliminated, as there is no need for such things in the collaboration of a large economic sphere.

#### TWO AGES

During the twenties and thirties, unemployment, agricultural distress, lack of planning, and private monopolies in many parts of the world sponsored the world-wide economic crisis. They were the distinguishing marks of the declining liberalistic-capitalistic era. While its representatives commanded over the treasures of the earth and plowed under cotton, burned wheat, and threw coffee into the sea, they hardly contributed anything toward removing that serious crisis. With mixed feelings they looked toward the Soviet Union. There, they said, the capitalist system had been brought to its final culminating point and the people subjected—by collectivization and by the liquidation of all active or potential enemies—to the aims of the chief "shareholders" of the state, the leaders of the Communist Party. There the problems of unemployment and social unrest had been brilliantly solved by forced labor and the GPU. There no one dared to protest against the dictates of the economic bosses.

In their own countries, the lords and masters of capitalism found things not quite so easy. The great experiment of the Versailles Treaty, with the motto: "Let the Germans pay," had failed. The obstructions placed in the way of Germany's recovery had a deteriorating influence on the economic structure of the victor nations themselves. While one international conference followed upon another to deliberate Germany's ability to pay and the growing difficulties in

world economics, Germany rid herself between 1933—the year of the last, unsuccessful world economic conference in London—and 1938 by her own efforts of all those scourges of her economy, awakening it to new, strong life.

Since then a bitter war has raged against National Socialism and all related movements. Its enemies have mobilized everything in the way of calumny, economic, political, and finally military pressure they could think of against it. That the successful application of National Socialist ideas in Germany could not be prevented was bad enough. What was far worse was that in the war years of 1939 to 1944 the European continent could submit the German economic methods to a test and achieve results with them which gave the nations concerned much food for thought. The people could not but remember conditions as they had been a few years previously, when Europe was confronted by armies of starving unemployed as well as acres of untilled fields and rich coal mines that had been shut down. It was only the discarding of the prewar mentality which put agricultural and industrial production on its feet again; and it was the tragic turn of fate, not Germany's wish, that the fruits of this production served war rather than peace.

#### FRANCE

The results of Franco-German collaboration after the armistice of June 1940 deserve particular attention, as there was little prewar foundation on which it could be built up and had to take into account the initial tension between a defeated, spiritually collapsed nation and its victor. The work of Marshal Pétain and the men around him will be judged properly one day, when the war-time fog of hatred has blown away.

The Compiègne armistice had laid a severe but clear foundation for mutual co-operation. The costs of occupation were fixed precisely. The German demand for their payment corresponded to international law. Even the liberators of France have resorted to this right since the invasion, thus admitting themselves that their action represents nothing but an occupation. As for the payments Germany received to defray her occupation costs, their major part was used to pay for goods and services in France. Accordingly, confidence in the French currency remained unshaken until the invading Allies brought their own bank notes and put them into circulation.

The central problems confronting the occupation power and the Pétain Government were the restoration of the system of communications and an increase of agricultural production. While the campaign was still being fought, the German armies had been followed by the columns of the Todt Organization which had begun to rebuild highways and bridges and to make the canals navigable again. 1943 saw

an almost peace-time train service and a traveling boom.

A hundred years ago, France was a great agricultural nation until, swept up by the capitalist trend and dazzled by her colonial wealth, she allowed her agriculture to decline far below the standard of her neighboring countries, both as regards its social condition and its production. Marxism, so powerful in France, also had little sympathy for the farmer and the rural worker, as Karl Marx had entirely ignored this class in his plans of World Revolution. There was not even an organization to represent the interests of the rural classes in France. Hence the creation of an agricultural union was one of the first reforms carried out after the armistice.

Before the war, France imported 12 billion francs' worth of foodstuffs annually, chiefly from her North African colonies. Now her population had to feed itself off her own soil, first in part and later entirely, when, as a result of the invasion of North Africa by the Americans in 1942, she lost the colonies and merchant ships left to her in the armistice. The measures undertaken by the military authorities were hence aimed above all at safeguarding France's food supplies by fully exploiting the soil, the labor resources, and all the means of production. All available tractors were converted to wood-gas fuel. Thousands of carloads of agricultural implements, cattle, horses, and seed rolled to France from the Reich. The results were promising. The wheat harvest of 1943 amounted to 6.5 million tons, surpassing that of 1942 by one million tons. For 1944 it was expected that sufficient bread, potatoes, and vegetables would be produced in France to cover all her needs. In order to improve storage facilities, 1,000 new silos were built in 1943 alone. Extensive measures were undertaken to keep insect pests in check, more than 130,000 sprays being distributed for use against the potato bug. So much flax was grown that in 1943 the Belgian industry had to help use up the crops.

France having before the war imported 20 to 25 million tons of her annual coal requirements of 70 to 75 million tons, the German coal supplies became indispensable for the getting under way of France's industry. Among the many other important raw materials imported from Germany was also cellulose, needed for the rapidly expanding staple-wool production. In order to improve the supply of power, projects were drawn up for the exploitation of France's rich water-power resources. Among them the attempt to exploit the huge forces of the Mont Blanc glaciers deserves attention for its originality. While France had more than half a million unemployed before the war, a perceptible shortage of labor made itself felt during the last few years. Germany could not allow prisoners of war to return en masse to France because she had to consider the possibility of

France becoming a battlefield and mobilizing once more against Germany. However, she changed the status of many prisoners into that of civilian laborers.

Gradually France re-entered European trade as a sovereign partner. In 1943, for example, she concluded a commercial treaty with Denmark, which provided for machinery, fish, and pharmaceutical products to be shipped from Denmark and machinery, spices, perfume, liqueurs, and wine to be sent from France, which, incidentally, shows that France continued to manufacture these prewar specialties of hers.

Six months after the invasion, Frederick Crawford, the president of the US Manufacturers' Association, returned home from an extensive trip through France. To the amazement of his countrymen, he reported that France had experienced a period of national prosperity under the German occupation, with excellent working conditions and adequate wages. In the years from 1941 to 1944, he said, French agriculture had enjoyed an unprecedented boom, and French industry had been supported on a large scale by Germany.

#### BELGIUM

Belgium and Holland constitute special cases. They were colonial powers, whose pre-war economy was based on close ties between the mother country and the colonies. Cut off from their colonies since the outbreak of war, they had completely to revise their economic system if they did not wish to starve. The German commander in chief in Belgium regarded it as his chief task immediately after the occupation to see that the agricultural administration co-operated closely with the Farmers' League in order to obtain the necessary food for the Belgian people from Belgian soil.

Before the war, Belgium imported 1,073,000 tons of wheat (home production: 423,000 tons) and 45,000 tons of rye (home production: 345,000 tons). Her wheat import was greater than that of Germany. The blockade might have had a disastrous effect on a country so dependent on imports. But the worst was prevented by rations, prohibition of feeding grain to cattle, and by increasing the wheat and rye acreage in the years 1940 to 1943 from 750,000 to 1,125,000 acres, that of potatoes from 200,000 to 300,000 acres. As a result of these measures, the proportion of Belgian home production in her food supplies rose to an extent never thought possible before. Nevertheless, there still remained a deficiency which had to be covered by supplies from European surplus regions, chiefly southeastern Europe. Germany delivered 400,000 tons of grain in the first year and from 40,000 to 100,000 tons in each of the following years. Belgium paid with industrial products and chemicals.

In addition to this promotion of agriculture, an extensive reconstruction program was carried out which showed the following results after two years :

84.5	per cent	of	damaged	factories	working	again
78.3	"	"	"	slightly	damaged	houses
56.9	"	"	"	badly	"	"
48.0	"	"	"	damaged	roads	repaired
20.7	"	"	"	completely	destroyed	houses
					rebuilt	

A large proportion of this damage was not inflicted during the short weeks of the German campaign but through the subsequent years of Allied air raids.

This work of reconstruction, and the recruiting of labor for Germany (for which 250,000 Belgian workmen had applied by January 1942), also did away with unemployment, which had been rampant before the war. In the social sphere the Winter Relief work organized on the German pattern proved so great a success that it survived the extirpation of all other German organizations after the invasion.

#### HOLLAND

Before the war the German market had been prepared to buy up the entire available production of the highly specialized Dutch agriculture and cattle raising. But it was prevented from doing so because Holland would not accept the corresponding amount of German industrial products in exchange. Instead, the Dutch turned to the English market. But exports to England required Government subventions, since the English paid low prices, the Dutch products having to compete with those from the British dominions and colonies. The result was that in part the rich harvests of Holland simply perished, as they could be neither exported nor bought by the Dutch population because of the high domestic prices.

So Holland, too, required a radical readjustment. It was rendered more difficult by the fact that the Dutch themselves had destroyed the basis of their communications, the canal system, with its many bridges, and had flooded large areas without, however, having stopped the German advance. With the aid of German sappers, the entire flooded areas were drained within three weeks; the ships that had been sunk to bar the waterways were removed, and hundreds of bridges were built. The land reclamation undertaken by the Dutch Government was continued in spite of difficulties arising from the war. 40,000 acres of land were reclaimed in 1942, mainly in the Zuider Zee.

The Dutch population was put on exactly the same food rations as the Germans in the Reich, all deficiencies being made up for. By changing over to a more vegetable diet, the Dutch were able by 1944 to feed themselves off their own soil.

The elimination of unemployment, which wealthy prewar Holland with her vast colonial

empire had not been able to achieve, became a fact by 1942 as the result of Holland's inclusion in the economics of Europe as a whole. One contributing factor was the placing of orders with Dutch industry, for which Germany supplied an annual average of three billion marks' worth of raw materials. A new social insurance system was introduced which went far beyond anything existing in rich prewar Holland. While compensation used to be paid only for the loss of wages resulting from sickness, all expenses incurred by sickness are now covered, and the participation of family members is also being considered. Old-age insurance rates were increased, and special tax legislation was passed to benefit Holland's large number of big families.

#### DENMARK

Denmark and Norway had also built up their economic system on factors lying outside their countries: Denmark on the export of high-grade farm products, Norway on her merchant marine. Both were hard hit by the outbreak of war.

Before the war, Danish farm products were sold chiefly in the English market. There these products, like the Dutch ones, met with stiff competition, so that Danish butter was a good deal cheaper in England than in Denmark, a large proportion of the Danes having to eat cheaper margarine instead. With the occupation of Denmark by German troops, a radical change set in in her economic system. By joining the economic system of Europe as a whole, Denmark became one of the most popular trade partners of the Continent. She concluded commercial treaties with thirteen countries, the smallest of which amounted to a few million and the largest—with Germany—to two billion kroner, and which in many cases provided for the exchange of peace-time products. In 1944, Denmark had an average monthly export surplus of some 15 million kroner (in 1943: 6 million kroner). Coal supplies which had formerly come from England were now undertaken by Germany. At the same time, a detailed study of her own resources showed that the lignite deposits on Jutland amount to some 15 million tons. By 1943 Denmark's peat production had risen to 4.8 million tons, i.e., twelve times the prewar average. Systematic drilling led to the discovery of natural gas, which supplied 1.1 million cubic meters of chemical gas in two years.

The main wealth of Denmark's agriculture, her cattle stock, amounted in 1939 to 3.3 million head, among them 1.6 million milch cows; it had, however, been largely dependent on imported fodder. By an intensification of fodder cultivation at home, the livestock which had temporarily diminished could by 1943 be brought to about 3 million head again. To



make up for the deficiency in imported fodder, the carbohydrates contained in cellulose have been made use of. The cows are fed cellulose in the form of grayish-white cardboard. Similar experiments were also made in Sweden, the new fodder being given the name of "wood oats." In reply to the blockade, the cultivation of various crops was encouraged. The flax acreage was increased from 2,500 acres before the war to 75,000 acres in 1944. The wheat crop rose by 50 per cent from 1942 to 1943, that of air-dried tobacco from 700,000 kilograms (1942) to 2.5 million kilograms (1944).

In 1942, communal taxes could be reduced in Copenhagen, as the city budget no longer required millions of kroner for unemployment relief. Government finances for the year 1942/43 closed with a surplus, as did the postal and telegraph administration. Agricultural profits increased in 1942 by 13 to 14 per cent in the case of small farms, 20 to 30 per cent in the case of medium-sized farms, as compared to prewar times. The annual average profits of Danish industry amounted in 1938 to 11.2 per cent, in 1942 to 10.7 per cent of the invested capital. This means that, although no excessive war profits were made, an adequate income was ensured. There was room left for new investments, and in 1943 the first Danish steel works were established with a capacity of 40,000 tons. National income rose to such an extent that, in order to prevent an inflation, legislation had to be passed in 1944 to freeze 3.9 billion kroner.

Incidentally, the ranks of Danish millionaires were swelled in 1941/42 by 23. But this trend was not only characteristic of the upper economic strata. People of all walks of life had so much time and money for amusement that, with unchanged rates, the revenue from entertainment tax rose from 13.2 million kroner in 1943 to 17.6 million kroner in 1944.

#### NORWAY

Norway had suffered badly from the war on her soil. Her merchant marine, one of her principal sources of income, was being used almost entirely by the Allies. But as soon as actual warfare ended, reconstruction was begun. In Major Vidkun Quisling the country found a fearless champion of Norwegian-German collaboration. As Norwegian military attaché in the USSR and close collaborator of Fritjof Nansen, Quisling had obtained deep insight into the Bolshevik system. One of Nansen's collaborators, he had worked in the famine districts of the Soviet Union, where millions of peasants perished.

4,038 kilometers of railway lines and 60 bridges totaling 3,595 meters in length, which had been destroyed during the campaign, were quickly rebuilt. To improve railway communications, Germany supplied 1,000 flat cars and many locomotives of the latest type up to

the middle of 1943.

In Norway, too, Germany became the largest trade partner.

#### Norway's Trade (in million Reichsmark)

	<i>Imports from Germany</i>	<i>Exports to Germany</i>
1938	130	80
1943	500	230

This placed Norway's supply of foodstuffs and industrial products on a sound footing. In 1943/44, imports from Germany consisted mainly of grain, fodder, coal, and agricultural machinery. Every second slice of bread consumed, 50 per cent of all sugar, and 30 per cent of all fats, were imported from Germany.

Norway's fishing industry now worked for the practically unlimited continental market and the majority of the fishermen earned several times as much as they did in peace time. With the aid of the new rapid-freezing methods and other modern cold-storage facilities, a new epoch was initiated in the fishing industry. Instead of dried fish, Norway could export higher-priced fresh fish, frozen fish, and fish fillets. Seaweed, which is rich in vitamin C, is being used as fertilizer and mixed with fodder. It also serves as the raw material for soap and rayon. The plentiful lichen, which contain much starch, are, after removal of the bitter substances, sold like leaf gelatine.

#### FINLAND

In her struggle for existence against Bolshevism, Finland received Germany's full support. What she needed more than anything else was food, for Finland could only cover her own requirements if she were to extend her cultivated land several times, which was not possible under the prevailing conditions of war. Accordingly, the German-Finnish trade agreement provided less for exchange quotas than for a German guarantee to cover the Finnish deficiency. In the agreement signed in the autumn of 1942, for instance, Germany undertook to supply Finland with all foodstuffs she lacked for the fiscal year 1942/43. As a result, Finnish bread rations could be raised to the German level. In 1943, 75 per cent of Finland's imports and 67 per cent of her exports were taken care of by Germany. Denmark followed in second place, and Sweden came third in imports, Italy in exports. In the same year the acting Finnish Minister of Trade and Industry could declare that Finland's foreign trade was in a considerably more favorable position than in peace time.

The cessation of German food supplies after the conclusion of the Finno-Soviet armistice was a heavy blow to Finland. Her bread rations had to be cut in half, and her meat rations became inadequate and irregular. Added to all other difficulties, a factor of the capitalist epoch made its appearance again which had disappeared almost entirely among the European

nations during the war years: the Soviets increased the Finnish import tariffs by 200 per cent, thereby isolating the occupied country from its former trade partners.

#### HUNGARY

The economic development of the Balkan states within the framework of European economies during the war was dealt with in the article "The Balkan Caldron" (February 1945). We shall only add a short table showing the way in which the economic interlacing of central and southeastern Europe was progressing:

#### Southeastern European Trade (in million Reichsmark)

	Imports from Germany	Exports to Germany
1933	435	327
1939	1,040	1,097
1940	1,344	1,404
1941	1,343	1,372
1942	1,862	2,020

In the case of two southeastern European countries, Hungary and Slovakia, which do not belong to the Balkans and were not discussed in the above-mentioned article, economic problems are different from those existing in western and northern Europe.

In order fully to exploit the great possibilities of agricultural exports to European countries during the war as well as in normal times, Hungary had substantially to increase the area under cultivation and to intensify her agricultural methods. For this purpose, large quantities of high-quality seed, imported in part from Germany, were distributed, for the years 1942/43 alone 1.9 million hundredweight; hundreds of thousands of shoots were also distributed for the cultivation of fruit and wine. The compulsory cultivation of industrial crops included sesame seed, castor oil, rubber plants, sugar beets, and tobacco. New agricultural vistas were opened up with the initiation of rice cultivation in the Pussta, which offered good climatic and soil conditions.

#### Hungarian Trade (in million Reichsmark)

	Imports from Germany	Exports to Germany
1938	100	150
1943	620	670

These figures strikingly show the benefits derived by the two trade partners as a result of mutual adaptation to each other's requirements. Under the impulse of these improvements, Hungary, like Denmark, became one of the most sought-after trade partners in Europe. Not the least attraction was the fact that she has also risen to sixth place among the tobacco producers of the world and is, next to Bulgaria, Europe's largest tobacco supplier. In 1943 the tobacco crop amounted to 23,220,000 kilograms.

The presence of oil in the Murr territory, the exploitation of which was begun, and, above all, the discovery of bauxite deposits near Budapest which rival the largest

in Europe in size, gave an additional impetus to Hungary's economics. Projects for the development of hydroelectric plants on the Danube at the Iron Gate, and elsewhere, were got under way.

#### SLOVAKIA

Slovakia, though only a small state, has clearly established her right to independence in the family of European nations by even exceeding the expectations placed on her future at the time of the declaration of her independence in 1938. Having already laid the foundations for agricultural self-sufficiency before the war, her agriculture experienced a war boom which was made possible by regular large supplies of agricultural machinery and seed, crude oil, and coal from Germany. The sale of all agricultural and industrial surpluses was assured, while under the old European economic system a state like Slovakia could hardly have found new markets.

On the third anniversary of independence, Slovakia's leader Tiso was able to assert that, during those three years, more public works—road building, railway building, soil amelioration, electrification—had been undertaken than in the twenty years of Czech rule. The Todt Organization had rendered great services in this connection, and Germany had lent a helping hand by supplying locomotives, automobiles, and other means of transport. New branches of industry were founded, including the manufacture of cellulose and synthetic fibers.

Since the country's independence, its industry invested 2.5 billion kronen for new construction and extension. National income rose from 10.9 billion kronen (1939) to 19.7 billion kronen (1944) with fairly stable prices. Out of Slovakia's 4.48 billion kronen of imports in 1943, 2.9 billions came from Germany, while 2.5 billions out of her 4.49 billions of exports went there.

#### "FASCISM"

In the multiplicity of individual traits in these developments—the short enumeration of which gives no more than a hint of the great difficulties that had to be overcome—the fundamental principles of National Socialist economics are clearly revealed:

In foreign trade: the distribution of production among the European nations for the purpose of achieving the most favorable results, as well as the principle of reciprocity (buy from your customer!).

In domestic economics: (1) a careful weighing of all economic possibilities, adjusting plans of production according to these possibilities while fully taking into account the demands of periods of crisis and distress. (2) All-encompassing market and price regulations which make possible on the one hand a profitable production and adequate wage payments, on the other

a just distribution. (3) Work as the moral obligation of every individual and an obligation on the part of the state to prevent unemployment.

All this does not only sound reasonable and simple: it has been put into successful practice in almost all the states of the European continent during the last few years. In spite of war-time restrictions and varying conditions in the different countries, these principles have proved themselves to be stimulants for strong productive forces and guarantors against starvation and chaos. However, the declared object of the Allies in the present war is their permanent extirpation. A sensible order based on these principles has two irreconcilable opponents: capitalism, which regards the coming into existence of a *Grossraum* organized according to noncapitalistic principles as a threat to its profits and power; and Bolshevism, which needs social strife, unemployment, and class hatred for its growth and consequently fears the rise of a continent-wide economic system based on collaboration and aiming at the welfare of all.

But how was it possible that, so close to the great thanksgiving day, such wide circles in many European countries were longing for D-day, although they were not able to suppress a feeling of uneasiness toward liberation by the Red Army? (Incidentally, were these circles as wide as the liberators claim? Did they form a majority, as good democratic procedure would require? Why all the collaborationist trials, to which there seems to be no end?)

In attempting to answer this question, we cannot ignore the underground movements, whose bold spirit and personal sacrifice have been praised so highly. Undoubtedly there were idealists in their ranks, among the Maquis and the partisan groups of every nation. But their military value was neither decisive nor indispensable for the Allies. In close co-operation with the British secret service and with Red agents, they had in reality a quite different and far more important task to fulfill: it was up to them to prevent the collaboration of their countrymen with the German occupation authorities, to impede the functioning of the National Socialist economic principles on a continent-wide scale. Whatever success they had can be traced, on the one hand, to their appeal to the heritage of history, the chauvinism of the peoples; on the other, to the fact that, in spite of German efforts to reduce the difficulties arising from the war, these difficulties could not be entirely eliminated and were blamed on Germany.

Now the German troops have withdrawn

from large areas. Starvation and political confusion are spreading in the footsteps of the Allied invasion armies and are giving rise to fears for the future of the Continent if Germany's strength should prove unequal to the assault from all sides. The "liberation" has now also confronted the Allied side with some of the basic problems of European economics. The transition from the German system of European economics to the Anglo-Saxon one of world economics is proving far more difficult than the Allies had expected. Unemployment is rising from week to week. In 1940, the German economic policy saw to a rapid incorporation of western Europe's production into the entire European sphere and abolished unemployment almost overnight. But as England and the United States are not a uniform economic sphere to which western Europe could be linked organically, western Europe representing in their eyes merely a tiny sector of world economics, they hesitate to conclude trade and clearing agreements; for they are afraid of an unfavorable effect on the Dominions and other parts of the world which might result from exclusive advantages contained in such agreements for western Europe.

Germany was able to interlock her economic organization with that of the occupied countries because she let herself be led by a European criterion. This is not possible in the case of the Anglo-Saxons, as their economic policy is conducted from the point of view of world economics. As for the Soviets, the peoples who fall under their control have no alternative but to be swallowed up by the Bolshevik economic system, which means producing for purposes foreign to their own interests.

\* \* \*

The liberators of Europe have brought no gifts for their friends on the Continent. Instead, they have ransacked storehouses and stocks accumulated in collaboration with Germany. What they do not need for themselves, they hand out with false generosity. As these stores are being used up, louder and louder cries for food are raised. "Did not the Nazis grow sunflowers and rapeseed? Hand over the oil!" comes the order from above. Fearful of being prosecuted as collaborationists, the trustees are delivering up the last reserves of oil to the new governments, which the latter ration out to the grumbling populace.

It is a long time since the last real harvest thanksgiving. "When will the next one be?" is the anxious question in everybody's mind. The Soviets are keeping an icy silence. The replies given by the Anglo-Saxons all amount to one thing only: postponed indefinitely.

### Definition

From Paris last week came a new definition of a collaborationist: "Anybody who collaborated more than you did." (*Time*)